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 Japanese people often trumpet their putatively “unique” characteristics vis-à-vis other 
nations.  This is particularly evident with respect to their saving and consumption behavior.  
According to various public opinion surveys, Japanese respondents overwhelmingly describe 
themselves as a people who love to save while exercising uncommon frugality in their 
consumption.1  By contrast, Western observers have generally criticized the Japanese for 
extolling such thriftiness and for saving too much and consuming too little.  For example, in 
the early 1980’s, when Japan was running record trade and current account surpluses, the United 
States and Japan’s other trading partners urged the Japanese government to promote 
consumption rather than saving as a way of reducing those surpluses, and the so-called 
Maekawa Report (which stressed the need to make Japan into a more consumption-oriented 
society) was the Japanese government’s response to such criticism.   The conventional 
wisdom, whether Japanese or foreign, regards the Japanese as big savers who shun borrowing 
and hold unusually conservative portfolios; the only difference is whether this is regarded as a 
good thing or a bad thing. 
This chapter marshals comparative data to examine whether Japanese saving and 
consumption is truly so distinctive.  Although we commonly compare Japan to “the West,” the 
Western countries themselves demonstrate considerable variation in their saving and 
consumption patterns.  How then does the saving and consumption behavior of the Japanese 
compare to that of other industrialized countries (notably the other Group of Seven or G7 
countries)?  If Japan does resemble some of the Western countries, is it more similar to the 
Anglo-Saxon countries or to continental Europe?   By exploring changes in saving and 
consumption behavior over time, this chapter also challenges the conventional view of Japanese 
thrift and frugality as static traits.  
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I. The Saving Behavior of the Japanese 
Are the Japanese Big Savers? 
 Do the Japanese save more than consumers in other countries?  To answer this 
question, I examine trends over time within Japan, followed by an international comparison.  I 
then seek to explain Japanese saving behavior in the past, present, and future. 
(1) Trends over Time.  As I have shown elsewhere,2 Japan’s household saving rate 
was volatile during the prewar, wartime, and early postwar periods.  Saving rates were low, 
sometimes even negative, during about half of the years in this period (1907-15, 1921-30, and 
1946-49).  However, saving rates were high and generally in the double digits, during the other 
years (1906, 1916-20, 1931-44, and 1950-54).  Indeed, household saving rates exceeded 30 or 
even 40 percent at the height of World War II (1941-44), when goods were scarce or rationed 
and when the state encouraged and often forced people to save.  Thus, there is no simple 
answer to the question of whether Japan’s household saving rates were high or low from 1906 to 
1954.  Saving rates ranged from negative to astonishingly high levels. 
Before we can assess saving rates in more recent decades, a methodological note is in 
order.  Scholars disagree in their interpretations of recent Japanese saving behavior, in part 
because the Japanese government switched from the United Nations’ System of National 
Accounts 1968 (SNA68) to the U.N.’s System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA93) in 2002, as 
a result of which a continuous time series for the entire postwar period is unfortunately not 
available.  Figure 1 shows National Accounts data on Japan’s household saving rate based on 
both Systems of National Accounts for the 1955-2002 period.  Data based on both Systems of 
National Accounts are available for the 1980-98 period, and as can be seen from Figure 1, the 
two series were relatively close in 1980-94 (within 2.6 percentage points).  However, the gap 
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between the two series widened to 3.3 to 4.9 percentage points in 1995-98 (with the series based 
on SNA93 falling below the SNA68 series except in 1990-91).  Moreover, trends in the 
household saving rate after 1991 differ greatly depending on which SNA we use.  The SNA68 
series leveled off in the 12.6 to 13.7 percent range during the 1991-98 period, whereas the 
SNA93 series reveals a sharp decline from 13.3 percent in 1991 to 5.4 percent in 2002.  Which 
series are we to believe? 
 The biggest difference between the two series lies in the treatment of bad loans.  The 
older SNA68 exaggerates the household saving rate for the following reason: under SNA68, 
write-offs of bad loans to households and unincorporated businesses are treated as a current 
transfer from financial institutions to households.  Thus, bad loan write-offs increase the 
incomes of households, and since their consumption does not change, their saving appears to 
increase.  By contrast, SNA93 treats write-offs of bad loans to households and unincorporated 
businesses as a decline in the asset holdings of financial institutions, and thus they do not affect 
the saving rates of households. 
 The leveling off of the SNA68 saving rate after 1991 primarily reflects the write-offs 
of bad loans to households and unincorporated businesses that financial institutions starting 
taking after the collapse of the bubble and is thus likely to be a temporary phenomenon.  If no 
write-offs of bad loans had been taken during this period, the SNA68 series would no doubt 
have revealed the same sharp decline as the SNA93 series.  I have much more faith in the  
series based on SNA93, and thus it appears that Japan’s household saving rate declined steadily 
after 1991 and that it is no longer high by either absolute or relative standards.3  
 As Figure 1 shows, Japan’s household saving rate was high (in the double digits) until 
the mid-1990s, peaking at 23.2 percent in 1974 and 1976 before declining sharply.  It exceeded 
20 percent during the 1973-78 period, 15 percent during most of the 1961-86 period, and 10 
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percent during the 1955-98 period (in the case of the series based on SNA68) and the 1955-95 
period (in the case of the series based on SNA93).  However, the more accurate SNA93 series 
has been in the single digits since 1996, falling to a paltry 5.4 percent in 2002.   
To sum up, Japan’s household saving rates were high during most of the postwar 
period (1955-95), but they have been low since 1996. 
 (2) International Comparison.  Cross-national comparisons of saving rates present 
even greater methodological challenges.  Data on household saving rates are available for 
twenty-one of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member 
countries.  However, for thirteen of these countries (including Japan), the data measure the net 
household saving rate, whereas for the other eight countries, they measure the gross household 
saving rate.  The difference is significant.  In the case of the net household saving rate, the 
numerator (household saving) and denominator (household disposable income) both exclude the 
depreciation (consumption of fixed capital) of households and unincorporated businesses 
whereas both the numerator and denominator of the gross household saving rate include 
depreciation.  Thus, the two are not comparable, and the gross household saving rate will 
invariably be much higher than the net household saving rate.  Because I wanted to compare 
the household saving rates of all OECD member countries for which data are available, I 
converted the gross household saving rate figures to a net basis by using a conversion factor of 
0.7 (which is the approximate ratio of the average net household saving rate to the average gross 
household saving rate for the countries and years used in the present analysis). 
 My comparative data challenge the conventional view that the Japanese are uniquely 
thrifty and/or high savers for all times.  Table 1 presents actual or estimated data on net 
household saving rates for the 1985-2002 period for the twenty-one OECD member countries 
for which data are available (Table 1A shows actual data on net and gross household saving 
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rates for the same years and the same countries).  The Japanese entered this period as notably, 
but not uniquely, high savers.  As Table 1 shows, in 1985, Japan’s household saving rate (16.5 
percent) was second only to Italy (21.5 percent) among the OECD member countries for which 
data are available, followed closely by Canada (15.8 percent) and South Korea (14.8 percent).  
Thereafter, however, Japan‘s household saving rate fell sharply both in level and rank, from 
16.5 percent in 1985 to 5.9 percent in 20024 and from second in 1985 to fourth to sixth in 
1990-2000 and to thirteenth in 2002 among the OCED countries for which data are available.  
When Japan’s household saving rate is compared to the OECD mean, it was nearly twice as 
high in 1985 but slightly lower in 2002.   
 It is noteworthy that Japan has shared the distinction of being a big saver with a 
variety of nations in both Europe and East Asia.  Among the OECD member countries for 
which data are available, the number one saver was Italy in 1985, South Korea (the only other 
East Asian member) in 1990, the Czech Republic in 1995 and 2000, and France in 2002.  
Other OECD members that have attained double-digit household saving rates at least once 
include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain.  If we 
confine our comparison to the Group of Seven (G7) countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), Japan was second only to Italy during the 
1985-95 period but fell to third (a tie) behind France and Italy in 2000 and to fourth behind 
France, Italy, and Germany in 2002.  Moreover, there are many non-OECD economies in Asia 
(such as China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) that appear to have higher household 
saving rates than Japan at present, notwithstanding the absence of comparable data. 
In addition, the Japanese government appears to have overestimated Japan’s 
household saving rate vis-à-vis other countries, with several conceptual differences and 
deficiencies in Japan’s official data imparting an upward bias in the level of Japan’s household 
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saving rate.5  
Although it is beyond the confines of this chapter, we should also note substantial 
variations in household saving rates among the Western nations.  The OECD member countries 
with the lowest household saving rates (those not exceeding 10 percent during the 1985-2002 
period) include Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and notably the United States.  
To sum up, the cross-national data challenge us to reevaluate our understanding of 
saving behavior in Japan and elsewhere.  First, the Japanese were unquestionably big savers 
until the mid-1990s, but they were hardly unique and showed a household saving rate that was 
roughly comparable to that of several leading continental European nations as well as to that of 
South Korea, a country that has long emulated Japan’s developmental policies.  These data 
present a challenge to those who insist that the Japanese are uniquely thrifty or that East Asians 
are systematically more inclined to save than “Westerners.” 
Second, the data also reveal that the United States and the other Anglo-Saxon 
countries (in particular, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) are more of an exception than 
Japan, showing virtually the lowest household saving rates among the major industrialized 
countries.   
Lastly, the data show that, in recent years, Japan’s household saving rate has fallen far 
below that of Europe’s leading savers and that it is converging to Anglo-Saxon levels, and I 
argue in section (4) below that it will decline even further in the future. 
(3) Why Were the Japanese Big Savers?  Elsewhere, I list more than thirty factors 
that have been invoked to explain Japan’s high household saving rate during much of the 
postwar period.6  Here, I examine what I consider to be the nine most salient factors. 
 First, the high rate of income growth during the high-growth era from the 1950s to 
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early 1970s undoubtedly helped raise Japan’s household saving rate.  When income grows too 
rapidly or unexpectedly, households often cannot adjust their living standards and consumption 
patterns at the same pace, and as a result, saving (the difference between income and 
consumption) tends to increase, at least temporarily.   
Second, household asset holdings were very low in Japan just after the Second World 
War.  The war destroyed much of Japan’s housing stock, and the postwar hyperinflation 
reduced the real value of financial assets to almost nothing.  Japanese households presumably 
saved as much as they did in part to restore their asset holdings to desired levels. 
Third, consumer credit was not readily available in Japan until recently, as I will 
discuss later.  As a result, Japanese households found it necessary to save in advance of major 
purchases such as purchases of housing, automobiles, furniture, and electrical appliances.  
Moreover, the paucity of credit also increased the need for precautionary saving because 
Japanese households knew that they would not be able to borrow in times of emergency. 
Fourth, Japan’s bonus system of compensation, whereby a large chunk of employee 
compensation is paid in the form of semiannual lump-sum bonuses, is often said to have 
encouraged or at least facilitated saving.  
Fifth, the age structure of Japan’s population was virtually the youngest among the 
industrialized countries until recently.  As Table 2 shows, in 1975, the share of the elderly 
(those aged 65 or older) in Japan’s total population was only 7.9 percent.  Among the OECD 
member countries Japan ranked second to last behind South Korea at 3.6 percent.  According 
to the life cycle hypothesis, the aggregate household saving rate will be higher in a country with 
a young population because the young typically work and save whereas the elderly typically 
retire from work and dissave.7 
Sixth, the Japanese government introduced many tax breaks for saving such as the 
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maruyū system (whereby the interest income on bank and postal deposits and on government 
bonds was tax-exempt, up to a limit).  These tax breaks may have induced Japanese 
households to save more than they would have otherwise.  
Seventh, public old-age pension benefits were relatively low in Japan until 1973.  
This made it necessary for Japanese households to save on their own to prepare for their life 
after retirement. 
Eighth, the Japanese government and a quasi-governmental organization formerly 
called the Central Council for Savings Promotion engaged in a variety of saving promotion 
activities.  Sheldon Garon has argued that these helped to raise the household saving rate in 
Japan.8 
Ninth, many attribute Japan’s high household saving rate to cultural factors.  They 
argue that frugality, considered a virtue in Confucian teachings, is part of the national character 
of the Japanese people. 
However, all of these factors are becoming less and less applicable over time.  (1) 
Double-digit rates of economic growth ended in the early 1970s, and income growth rates have 
been embarrassingly low in recent years, especially in the 1990s; (2) Japanese households have 
accumulated high levels of assets (see below); (3) consumer credit has become widely available 
(see below), (4) most companies have scaled back bonuses as a result of the prolonged recession, 
(5) Japan’s population is aging at an unprecedented rate, with the share of the population aged 
65 or older to the total population rising from 7.9 percent (next to last place) in 1975 to 17.2 
percent (third place) in 2000 (see Table 2); (6) most tax breaks for saving were abolished in 
1988; (7) public old-age pension benefits were dramatically improved in 1973; (8) government 
saving promotion activities have been scaled back, and the Central Council for Savings 
Promotion was renamed the Central Council for Savings Information in 1988, due in large part 
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to pressure from Japan’s trading partners, although private sector initiatives remain; and (9) the 
longstanding culture of thrift may decline over time as foreign influences infiltrate the country.    
The weakening of these factors can explain why Japan’s household saving rate has declined so 
sharply since the mid-1970s. 
(4) Will the Japanese Once Again Become Big Savers?  In my opinion, the most 
important factor determining future trends in Japan’s household saving rate will be the rapid 
aging of the population.  Japan’s population is aging rapidly and will soon become the most 
aged in the world.  As Table 2 shows, the share of the population aged 65 or older to the total 
population in Japan is projected to increase from 17.2 percent in 2000 to 28.9 percent (highest 
among the OECD member countries) in 2025.  An aged population will save at lower rates, 
just as a younger population will save at higher levels, according to the life cycle hypothesis.    
When young, individuals generally work and save a portion of their incomes, while after 
retirement, they dissave their previously accumulated savings.  Thus, the rapid aging of 
Japan’s population has presumably contributed to the sustained decline in its household saving 
rate in recent years.  With the aging of Japan’s population projected to continue at a rapid rate, 
the decline in its household saving rate can also be expected to continue at a rapid rate.  Indeed, 
a number of authors, myself included, have calculated that the rapid aging of Japan’s population 
will cause Japan’s household saving rate to decline to zero or even negative levels by around 
2010.9   
 I should note, however, that the discussion thus far has focused exclusively on the 
impact of the aging of the population on the household saving rate.  There are, of course, other 
factors that will influence the household saving rate, and I now discuss four short-term factors 
that may have been important during the current recession that began in 1991.10 
First, sharp declines in land and equity prices have led to sharp declines in the value of 
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household holdings of land and equities, and this in turn should have encouraged households to 
save more in order to make up for the capital losses on their land and equity holdings. 
Second, the current recession has undoubtedly increased the anxieties that the 
Japanese harbor about future income and employment prospects, living expenses during old age, 
and public old-age pensions.  These increased anxieties should also have encouraged 
households to save more. 
Third, consumer price deflation has continued for a number of years.  It, too, should 
have encouraged households to save more because, in a situation in which consumer prices are 
declining over time, households can save money by postponing their purchases of consumer 
goods and services.  However, consumer price deflation will also increase the real value of 
household holdings of financial assets, which in turn will induce people to consume more and 
save less.  In short, the net impact of consumer price deflation on the household saving rate is 
theoretically ambiguous. 
 Fourth, the profits of individual proprietors have been stagnant during the current 
recession, and this has lessened their ability to save, thereby lowering the saving rate of the 
household sector as a whole. 
In sum, two of these short-term factors should have held up Japan’s household saving 
rate during the past decade, one of them should have put downward pressure thereon, and one of 
them appears to be ambiguous in its impact.  Thus, even if the Japanese economy recovers 
from the current recession and these short-term factors cease to apply, recovery should not have 
a substantial impact on Japan’s household saving rate.  In either event, I predict that Japan’s 
household rate will continue its rapid decline. 
 
Are the Japanese Asset-Rich?  
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  High saving rates usually lead to high asset or wealth holdings because wealth is 
simply the cumulation of past saving.  Thus, in this subsection, I turn my attention from saving 
to wealth and consider whether the asset or wealth holdings of the Japanese are high absolutely 
as well as relative to the other industrialized countries.   
 Table 3 shows data on household wealth and indebtedness for the Group of Seven 
(G7) countries for the 1990-2001 period.  Looking first at data on net wealth or net worth (the 
broadest concept of wealth, defined as financial assets plus non-financial or real assets minus 
liabilities), Japan ranked first among the G7 countries in all four of the years for which data are 
shown even though net wealth or net worth declined sharply after 1990 due to the collapse of 
the bubble (the collapse of land and equity prices)--from a whopping 9.5 times household 
disposable income in 1990 to 7.5 to 7.6 times household disposable income in 1995, 2000, and 
2001.  The corresponding ratio was 6.4 to 7.5 times in Italy, 5.6 to 7.5 times in the United 
Kingdom, 5.1 to 6.3 times in France, 5.4 to 5.8 times in Germany, 4.7 to 5.9 times in the United 
States, and 4.2 to 5.1 times in Canada.   
Moreover, the individual components of household wealth were also generally much 
higher in Japan.  For example, Japan ranked first among the G7 countries with respect to 
financial assets in three out of the four years for which data are shown (1990, 1995, and 2001) 
and was second behind the United Kingdom in the remaining year (2000), with financial asset 
holdings ranging from 4.0 to 4.8 times household disposable income.  Similarly, Japan ranked 
second behind Italy among the G7 countries with respect to non-financial or real assets (land, 
housing, and consumer durables) in three out of the four years for which data are shown (1995, 
2000, and 2001) and was first in the remaining year (1990), with holdings of non-financial or 
real assets ranging from 4.1 to 6.8 times household disposable income.  Finally, Japan ranked 
first among the G7 countries with respect to total assets (the sum of financial assets and 
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non-financial assets) in all four years for which data are shown, with total asset holdings 
ranging from 8.9 to 10.8 times household disposable income.   
In terms of trends over time, non-financial or real assets declined sharply throughout 
the 1990-2001 period due to the sharp decline in land prices while financial assets continued to 
increase throughout this period despite the sharp decline in equity prices.  As a result of these 
conflicting trends, both total assets and net wealth or net worth declined sharply between 1990 
and 1995 but stabilized thereafter. 
Thus, it appears that the Japanese are indeed asset-rich both absolutely as well as 
relative to the other G7 countries.  This enormous wealth of the Japanese is presumably due 
partly to their high saving rates and partly to the rapid increase in land and equity prices during 
much of the postwar period, but since Japanese household saving rates are no longer unusually 
high and since land and equity prices have been plummeting for more than a decade, both the 
level of household wealth in Japan and the gap in household wealth between Japan and the other 
G7 countries are much lower now than they were a decade ago and can be expected to decline 
even further in the future.  
 
Do the Japanese Shun Borrowing? 
Typically, high saving and low borrowing go hand in hand because both are 
manifestations of frugality and both are ways of holding down consumption.  Thus, in this 
section, I turn my attention to the borrowing side of the ledger.  As Table 3 shows, Japan 
ranked first among the G7 countries with respect to outstanding liabilities in all four of the years 
for which data are shown, with outstanding liabilities ranging from 1.3 to 1.4 times household 
disposable income in Japan, as compared to 1.1 to 1.2 times in the United Kingdom, 0.9 to 1.2 
times in Canada, 0.9 to 1.1 times in the United States, 0.7 to 1.1 times in Germany, 0.7 to 0.8 
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times in France, and 0.3 to 0.4 times in Italy.  Moreover, even though conventional wisdom is 
that household liabilities consist mostly of mortgages (housing loans) in Japan, the share of 
mortgages in household liabilities is much lower in Japan than it is in all of the other G7 
countries in all four of the years for which data are shown, ranging from 39 to 45 percent in 
Japan, as compared to 70 to 73 percent in the United Kingdom, 68 to 76 percent in France, 67 to 
70 percent in the United States, 61 to 77 percent in Germany, 61 to 67 percent in Canada, and 47 
to 74 percent in Italy (see Table 4).  Thus, in Japan, household debt is used to finance 
consumption to a greater extent than it is in the other G7 countries. 
 Data for the more distant past show that outstanding liabilities were merely 60 and 77 
percent of household disposable income in Japan in 1970 and 1980, respectively, indicating  
that the Japanese did, in fact, shun borrowing in the past.  (The data presented in the Andrew 
Gordon paper in this volume corroborate my finding that consumer credit did not “take off” in 
Japan until the late 1980s.)  However, Japanese households now borrow more than consumers 
in the other industrialized countries and their household debt is used to finance consumption to a 
greater extent than in the other industrialized countries.  This dramatic change is presumably 
due partly to changes in consumer attitudes and partly to the rapid development of credit 
markets in recent years. 
 
Are Japanese Household Portfolios Unusually Conservative? 
 As Table 4 shows, Japan ranks lowest among the G7 countries with respect to the 
share of equities in financial assets in three of the four years for which data are shown (1995, 
2000, and 2001).   In 1990, it ranked second from the bottom (ahead of Germany), but this 
was during the bubble period when equity prices were temporarily inflated.  The share of 
equities in financial assets has ranged from 7-14 percent in Japan, as compared to 34-46 percent 
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in France, 18-45 percent in Italy, 15-31 percent in the United States, 18-28 percent in Canada, 
18-23 percent in the United Kingdom, and 6-27 percent in Germany. 
 These data confirm that Japanese households are the most conservative in the G7, 
investing only a small share of their assets in equities and a correspondingly large share in bank 
and postal deposits and land/housing.  This conservative portfolio can presumably be 
explained in large part by such factors as: (1) the high brokerage fees charged by securities 
companies, (2) the large minimum lot sizes when buying and selling equities, (3) consumer 
mistrust of securities companies arising from widely publicized scandals involving securities 
companies, (4) tax breaks for saving (which applied mostly to bank and postal deposits), (5) the 
lack of consumer financial education, (6) the high price of land and housing, and (7) a higher 
degree of risk aversion in Japan.  The collapse of equity prices in the early 1990s and their 
continued stagnation since then also partially explain the low share of equities in Japan.  
Indeed, the decline in the share of equities in financial assets from 14.4 percent in 1990 to 7.1 
percent in 2001 is attributable to the collapse and continued stagnation of equity prices.  
However, the collapse of the Tokyo stock market cannot be the only explanation of the low 
share of equities in Japan because it was already the second lowest among the G7 countries in 
1990, even before the collapse of equity prices. 
 
 To summarize, the Japanese used to be big savers, but they no longer are.  They used 
to rely relatively little on borrowing, but they do now.  The Japanese do, however, continue to 
hold a high level of assets and to hold conservative portfolios.   
 
II. The Consumption Behavior of the Japanese 
 To what extent has consumption behavior in Japan changed over time, and how does it 
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compare to that in the other industrialized countries?  Let us examine data on both 
consumption levels and the composition of consumption.11  
 
Are the Japanese Big Spenders? 
How do Japanese consumption levels compare to those in the other G7 countries?  
Since the figures for each country are expressed in the currency of that country, it is necessary to 
convert the figures for each country into a common currency (say, U.S. dollars) when making 
inter-country comparisons.  If this is done using market exchange rates, the figures will be 
biased to the extent that price levels vary from country to country.  Indeed, because of Japan’s 
high price levels, market exchange rates would lead us to conclude erroneously that the 
Japanese consume at levels far above the average of both the G7 and OECD countries.12  It is 
therefore preferable to convert the figures for each country to a common currency using 
purchasing power parities, which take account of differences in price levels among countries. 
Table 5 presents data on per capita household final consumption expenditure in Japan 
and the other G7 countries during the 1970-2001 period in U.S. dollars, with the conversion to 
U.S. dollars being done using purchasing power parities.  Japanese consumption levels showed 
considerable improvement during much of this period but continued to lag far behind the 
free-spending Americans and also lagged behind the other G7 and OECD member countries.   
Consumption levels in Japan improved sharply from 44.4 percent of U.S. levels in 1970 to 58.4 
percent in 1985.  As measured against the G7 average, Japanese consumption levels rose from 
70.7 percent in 1970 to 87.4 percent in 1985.  And relative to the OECD average, Japanese 
consumption levels increased from 72.6 percent in 1970 to 92.8 percent in 1985.  However, it 
is noteworthy that Japanese consumption levels have not improved relatively since then, 
remaining at 58-60 percent of U.S. levels, 87-88 percent of the G7 average, and 93-94 percent 
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of the OECD average.  With respect to Japan’s rank among the G7 countries, Japan ranked 
seventh (last) in 1970, sixth (ahead of the United Kingdom) in 1985, and sixth (ahead of France) 
in 2000 and 2001.   
By contrast, the United States stands out as a colossus of consumption throughout this 
period (see Lizabeth Cohen’s essay in this volume).  Despite expanding consumption in the 
other G7 countries, no other G7 country managed to consume at more than 69 percent of U.S 
levels during the 1970-2001 period.  To be sure, Japanese consumption levels have been at or 
near the bottom of the G7 countries, but notwithstanding Japan’s reputation for uniqueness, it is 
the United States that jumps off the charts when it comes to consumption. 
 
Are Japanese Consumption Patterns Unique? 
 Having established that Japan, like the other G7 countries, consumes at levels far 
below that of the United States, I now compare the composition of consumption in Japan to that 
in the other G7 countries.   
The most important indicator of consumption patterns is the so-called Engel 
coefficient (defined as the budget share of food and non-alcoholic beverages), and needless to 
say, a lower Engel coefficient is indicative of a higher standard of living.  As the 
(constant-price) data I analyze elsewhere show,13 Japan’s Engel coefficient was very high (55.9 
percent) just after the Second World War, but it has shown a phenomenal decline (improvement) 
during the postwar period, falling to 45.4 percent in 1955, 35.4 percent in 1965, 27.6 percent in 
1975, and 22.2 percent in 1985.   
Table 6 shows a twelve-way breakdown of the final consumption expenditure of 
households by purpose for the G7 countries for 1990 and 2001, and as this table shows, Japan’s 
Engel coefficient declined further to 16.5 percent in 1990 and 14.2 percent in 2001.  Thus, 
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Japan’s Engel coefficient is now only about one-quarter of what it was a half century ago.   
Despite this phenomenal improvement, however, Japan’s Engel coefficient was still 
the second highest among the G7 countries in both 1990 and 2001.  In 1990, it was 16.5 
percent, behind first-place Italy (18.2 percent) but well above the G7 average of 13.4 percent 
and the last-place country (the United States) (8.5 percent), and in 2001, it was 14.2 percent, 
behind first-place Italy (15.1 percent) but well above the G7 average of 11.8 percent and the 
last-place country (the United States) (7.1 percent).  Moreover, although Japan’s Engel 
coefficient declined somewhat between 1990 and 2001 in absolute terms, it has shown little or 
no relative improvement during this time period: the ratio of Japan’s Engel coefficient to the G7 
average declined slightly from 1.23 to 1.21 times, but its ratio to the U.S. figure increased 
slightly from 1.94 to 2.01 times, and it is now slightly more than twice the U.S. figure.   
Turning to a discussion of the other categories of consumption, the most unusual 
features of consumption patterns in Japan (aside from the high Engel coefficient) are the 
relatively low shares of “transport,” “furnishings, household equipment and routine 
maintenance of the house,” and “health” in both 1990 and 2001, the relatively low share of 
“restaurants and hotels” in 1990, the relatively low share of “clothing and footwear” in 2001, 
the relatively high share of “recreation and culture” in both 1990 and 2001, and the relatively 
high share of “housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels” in 2001 (see Table 6). 
 Japan’s consumption patterns look more “backward” than those of the other G7 
countries at first glance inasmuch as the budget shares of necessities such as food and housing 
are relatively high and the budget shares of luxuries such as transport, furnishings/household 
equipment/etc., health, and restaurants/hotels are relatively low (the main exceptions being that 
the budget share of clothing (a necessity) is relatively low and that the budget share of 
recreation/culture (a luxury) is relatively high).  However, Japan’s consumption patterns are 
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heavily influenced by factors other than income levels.  For example, Japan’s high Engel 
coefficient is due in large part to the much higher food prices in Japan, which in turn are due to 
the scarcity of arable land, government regulation of food prices, and restrictions on food 
imports.  Similarly, the high budget share of housing in Japan is due in large part to high rents, 
which, in turn, are due in large part to the scarcity of land; the low budget share of transport is 
due in large part to the low automobile ownership rate, which, in turn, is due in large part to 
high gasoline prices, high expressway tolls, high parking fees, and the availability of public 
transportation; and the low budget share of health in Japan is due in large part to a presence of a 
universal national health insurance program. 
 
 To summarize, Japan showed phenomenal improvement in consumption levels and 
consumption patterns during the postwar period, and as a result, its consumption levels and 
consumption patterns are now roughly comparable to those of the other G7 countries but are 
still well behind those of the United States.  
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter has analyzed the saving and consumption behavior of the Japanese, 
examining trends over time as well as comparisons with the other industrialized countries 
(mostly the Group of Seven countries).  Are the conventional wisdoms about Japanese saving 
and consumption behavior correct?  Yes and no, depending on which behavior and which 
period one is discussing.  The Japanese were big savers during parts of the prewar, wartime, 
and early postwar periods and throughout the 1955-95 period but not any longer, and  
household saving rates can be expected to decline even further in the future.  The Japanese did 
used to shun borrowing but not any longer.  The Japanese are still wealthy despite the decline 
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in equity and land prices, and the Japanese do continue to hold conservative portfolios.  Finally, 
although the Japanese steadily increased their consumption levels during the postwar period, 
they still do not consume quite as much as most other G7 countries and far less than Americans, 
and although the consumption patterns of the Japanese improved dramatically during the 
postwar period, Japan’s consumption patterns are still not quite as affluent as those of most 
other G7 countries and far less affluent than those of the United States. 
.  .   Are the Japanese unique?  No, the saving and consumption behavior of the Japanese 
is admittedly quite different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States), which have low household saving rates, low net wealth, low 
real assets, high consumption levels, and low Engel coefficients.   However, Japanese saving 
and consumption behavior is surprisingly similar to that of the continental European 
countries--France, Germany, and especially Italy, all of which exhibit a high household saving 
rate, high net worth, high real assets, low consumption levels, and high Engel coefficients.  On 
the other hand, Japan (and Germany) more closely resemble the Anglo-Saxon countries with 
respect to high levels of both financial assets and liabilities.  With respect to total assets and 
equity shares, there appear to be no systematic differences between Continental Europe/Japan 
and the Anglo-Saxon countries.  Interestingly, Italy fits the conventional wisdoms about Japan 
more closely than Japan itself.  Italy not only has a high household saving rate, high net worth, 
and high real assets but its household saving rate has historically surpassed even Japan’s, its real 
assets today exceed those of Japan, and it has low liabilities, unlike Japan. 
 An analysis of the striking differences in saving and consumption behavior between 
Continental Europe/Japan and the Anglo-Saxon countries awaits another paper.  However, one 
explanation may be that high land/housing prices--combined with capital market imperfections 
and a strong desire for homeownership--in Continental Europe/Japan led to the high household 
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saving rates, high net wealth, high real assets, low financial assets, and low liabilities in these 
countries.14  In any event, all too often, scholars compare Japan only to the United States, but 
such narrow comparisons create the false impression that Japan is unique.  We should bear in 
mind that Japan and Continental Europe are quite similar in many ways and avoid exaggerating 
the distinctiveness of Japan.  When it comes to saving and consumption, it is American 
exceptionalism (together with that of Canada and the United Kingdom) that demands further 
study. 
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Notes: The line marked “SNA68” shows data based on the United Nations’ System of National 
Accounts 1968, whereas the line marked “SNA93” shows data based on the United Nations’ 
System of National Accounts 1993.  Payments in kind for medical and other services from 
social insurance have been added to the denominator of the SNA93 figures to make them 
comparable to the SNA68 figures. 
 
Source: Department of National Accounts, Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet 
Office, Government of Japan, ed., Annual Report on National Accounts, 2004 edition (Tokyo: 
National Printing Bureau, 2004), and earlier editions of the same. 
Figure 1: Trends in Japan's Household Saving Rate, 1955-2002
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Calendar Year SNA68 SNA93
1955 11.9
1956 12.9
1957 12.6
1958 12.3
1959 13.7
1960 14.5
1961 15.9
1962 15.6
1963 14.9
1964 15.4
1965 15.8
1966 15.0
1967 14.1
1968 16.9
1969 17.1
1970 17.7
1971 17.8
1972 18.2
1973 20.4
1974 23.2
1975 22.8
1976 23.2
1977 21.8
1978 20.8
1979 18.2
1980 17.9 15.4
1981 18.4 16.2
1982 16.7 14.9
1983 16.1 14.3
1984 15.8 14.3
1985 15.6 13.7
1986 15.6 13.0
1987 13.8 11.5
1988 13.0 11.9
1989 12.9 12.0
1990 12.1 12.3
1991 13.2 13.3
1992 13.1 12.5
1993 13.4 12.0
1994 13.3 11.1
1995 13.7 10.4
1996 13.4 8.5
1997 12.6 8.6
1998 13.4 9.6
1999 9.2
2000 8.2
2001 5.6
2002 5.4
Data for Figure 1: Trends in Japan's Household
Saving Rate, 1955-2002
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1985 1990 1995 2000 2002
Australia 10.8 7 9.3 9 4.8 17T 3.4 16T 0.6 19
Austria 10.5 8 14.0 4T 11.7 7 8.3 8 7.6 8T
*Belgium 11.1 6 12.1 8 13.2 5 9.2 7 10.1 5
Canada 15.8 3 13.0 7 9.2 12 4.6 15 4.2 16
Czech Rep. na na 20.6 1 13.0 1 11.3 2
*Denmark na 7.8 11T 4.8 17T 3.4 16T 5.0 15
Finland 3.4 14 1.8 16 4.8 17T -1.4 20 -1.4 20
France 8.9 10 7.8 11T 11.2 9T 11.0 3 12.0 1
Germany 12.1 5 13.7 6 11.2 9T 9.8 5T 10.6 4
*Italy 21.5 1 19.5 2 15.8 3 10.1 4 11.1 3
Japan 16.5 2 14.0 4T 11.9 6 9.8 5T 5.9 13
South Korea 14.8 4 22.0 1 16.8 2 11.5 2 7.6 8T
Netherlands 5.6 13 17.5 3 14.4 4 6.8 11 8.6 6
New Zealand 1.3 16 0.7 18 -3.8 21 -4.1 21 -5.2 21
Norway -3.3 17 1.5 17 4.6 20 4.5 13 6.9 11
*Portugal na na 9.5 11 7.6 9T 8.5 7
*Spain 7.8 11 8.6 10 11.3 8 7.6 9T 7.4 10
*Sweden 2.2 15 0.0 19 5.8 15 1.7 19 5.7 14
*Switzerland na 6.1 14 6.6 14 5.8 12 6.8 12
*United Kingdom 6.9 12 5.6 15 7.0 13 3.9 14 3.7 17T
United States 9.2 9 7.8 11T 5.6 16 2.8 18 3.7 17T
OECD Mean 9.1 9.6 9.4 6.2 6.2
Source: OECD Economic Outlook , vol. 2003/1, no. 73 (June 2003); vol. 2003/2, no. 74
(December 2003), Annex Table 24.
Table 1: Net Household Saving Rates of Selected OECD Countries, 1985-2002
Notes: The left-hand figures denote the household saving rate, defined as household saving
as a ratio of disposable household income, while the right-hand figures denote the rank of
each country.  "na" denotes "not available," while "T" denotes "tie."  The first figure for New
Zealand is the figure for 1986 because the figure for 1985 was not available.  The figures
include the saving of households as well as that of non-profit institutions except in the case
of the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Japan, and New Zealand.  For countries marked by
an asterisk, only figures on gross household saving rates were available, and the gross figures
were converted to a net basis by using a conversion factor of 0.7 (which is the approximate
ratio of the average net household saving rate to the average gross household saving rate for
the countries and years used in the present analysis).
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1985 1990 1995 2000 2002
Australia 10.8 5 9.3 7 4.8 10T 3.4 10 0.6 11
Austria 10.5 6 14.0 3T 11.7 5 8.3 6 7.6 5T
Canada 15.8 2 13.0 6 9.2 8 4.6 8 4.2 9
Czech Rep. na na 20.6 1 13.0 1 11.3 2
Finland 3.4 10 1.8 10 4.8 10T -1.4 12 -1.4 12
France 8.9 8 7.8 8T 11.2 6T 11.0 3 12.0 1
Germany 12.1 4 13.7 5 11.2 6T 9.8 4T 10.6 3
Japan 16.5 1 14.0 3T 11.9 4 9.8 4T 5.9 8
South Korea 14.8 3 22.0 1 16.8 2 11.5 2 7.6 5T
Netherlands 5.6 9 17.5 2 14.4 3 6.8 7 8.6 4
New Zealand 1.3 11 0.7 12 -3.8 13 -4.1 13 -5.2 13
Norway -3.3 12 1.5 11 4.6 12 4.5 9 6.9 7
United States 9.2 7 7.8 8T 5.6 9 2.8 11 3.7 10
OECD Mean 8.8 10.3 9.5 6.2 5.6
Belgium 15.9 2 17.3 2 18.8 2 13.2 2 14.4 2
Denmark na 11.2 4 6.9 8 4.8 7 7.2 7
Italy 30.7 1 27.8 1 22.5 1 14.4 1 15.9 1
Portugal na na 13.6 4 10.9 3 12.1 3
Spain 11.1 3 12.3 3 16.2 3 10.8 4 10.6 4
Sweden 3.2 5 0.0 7 8.3 7 2.4 8 8.2 6
Switzerland na 8.7 5 9.4 6 8.3 5 9.7 5
United Kingdom 9.8 4 8.0 6 10.0 5 5.5 6 5.3 8
OECD Mean 14.1 12.2 13.2 8.8 10.4
Source: The same as Table 1.
Table 1A: Household Saving Rates of Selected OECD Countries, 1985-2002
Net Household Saving Rate
Gross Household Saving Rate
Notes: See Table 1.
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Country
Australia 8.7 17T 12.3 18T 18.6 18
Austria 14.9 2 15.6 10T 24.3 7
Belgium 13.9 5 17.0 4T 23.7 8
Canada 8.5 19 12.6 17 20.7 16T
Czech Rep. 12.9 9 13.8 15 23.1 10
Denmark 13.4 8 15.0 13 22.5 11
Finland 10.6 13 14.9 14 25.2 5
France 13.5 7 16.0 7T 22.2 12
Germany 14.8 3 16.4 6 24.6 6
Italy 12.0 11 18.1 1 25.7 3
Japan 7.9 20 17.2 3 28.9 1
South Korea 3.6 21 7.1 21 16.9 21
Netherlands 10.8 12 13.6 16 21.9 13T
New Zealand 8.7 17T 11.7 20 18.5 19T
Norway 13.7 6 15.4 12 21.8 15
Portugal 9.9 16 15.6 10T 20.7 16T
Spain 10.0 15 17.0 4T 23.6 9
Sweden 15.1 1 17.4 2 25.4 4
Switzerland 12.6 10 16.0 7T 27.1 2
United Kingdom 14.0 4 15.8 9 21.9 13T
United States 10.5 14 12.3 18T 18.5 19T
OECD Mean 11.4 14.8 22.7
Table 2: Share of the Aged Population in Selected OECD Countries, 1975-2025
Notes: The left-hand figures denote the share of the population aged 65 or older to the
total population, while the right-hand figures denote the rank of each country.  "na"
denotes "not available," while "T" denotes "tie."
Source: United Nations, World Population Ageing, 1950-2050 (New York, N.Y.:
United Nations, 2002).
1975 2000 2025
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Country
Canada
Net wealth 416.5 7 483.7 7 506.7 7 507.4 7
Net financial wealth 177.5 5 225.7 4 244.1 6 238.1 6
Non-financial assets 239.0 6 258.0 6 262.6 6 269.3 6
Financial assets 270.4 4 329.1 4 357.1 5 353.2 4
of which:  Equities 49.6 5 66.3 4 94.4 5 98.6 4
Total assets 509.4 7 587.1 6 619.7 7 622.5 6
Liabilities 92.9 3 103.4 3 113.0 4 115.2 3
of which:  Mortgages 59.2 3 68.8 2 69.8 4 69.9 4
France
Net wealth 541.8 4 507.6 6 629.3 4 613.6 4
Net financial wealth 169.6 6 195.0 6 282.6 5 255.1 4
Non-financial assets 372.2 5 312.6 4 346.7 5 358.6 4
Financial assets 248.3 5 262.9 5 359.2 4 336.7 5
of which:  Equities 114.1 1 89.6 2 155.7 1 129.8 1
Total assets 620.5 4 575.5 7 705.9 4 695.3 4
Liabilities 78.7 5 67.9 6 76.6 6 81.7 6
of which:  Long-term loans 53.4 5 51.6 6 55.2 6 55.6 6
Germany
Net wealth 535.6 5 563.1 3 583.9 6 568.5 5
Net financial wealth 130.8 7 135.6 7 162.9 7 159.0 7
Non-financial assets 404.8 3 360.6 3 351.0 4 340.4 5
Financial assets 200.7 7 236.2 7 277.3 7 270.9 7
of which:  Equities 11.6 7 42.3 7 74.8 6 67.8 6
Total assets 605.5 5 596.8 5 628.3 6 611.3 7
Liabilities 70.0 6 100.6 4 114.4 3 112.0 4
of which:  Mortgages 53.6 4 61.0 4 72.5 2 72.1 3
Italy
Net wealth 636.9 2 699.3 2 748.3 3 714.2 2
Net financial wealth 196.3 4 224.0 5 294.6 4 251.7 5
Non-financial assets 440.5 2 475.3 1 453.7 1 462.5 1
Financial assets 225.4 6 254.6 6 329.8 6 287.0 6
of which:  Equities 46.0 6 46.5 5 147.4 3 102.5 3
Total assets 665.9 3 729.9 2 783.5 3 749.5 3
Liabilities 29.1 7 30.6 7 35.3 7 35.3 7
of which:  Medium and
long-term loans 13.7 7 18.6 7 25.7 7 26.0 7
Japan
Net wealth 947.6 1 757.1 1 762.3 1 753.1 1
Net financial wealth 268.0 1 289.1 2 344.0 3 344.7 1
Non-financial assets 679.6 1 468.0 2 419.3 2 408.4 2
Financial assets 398.8 1 426.2 1 477.7 2 483.5 1
of which:  Equities 57.3 3 45.9 6 42.8 7 34.4 7
Total assets 1078.4 1 894.2 1 897.0 1 891.9 1
Liabilities 130.8 1 137.1 1 133.7 1 138.8 1
of which:  Mortgages 50.6 6 58.5 5 59.3 5 61.9 5
Table 3: Household Wealth and Indebtedness in the Group of Seven Countries, 1990-2001
1990 1995 2000 2001
(continued)
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Table 3 (continued)
United Kingdom
Net wealth 611.0 3 555.9 4 748.8 2 682.3 3
Net financial wealth 214.1 3 281.3 3 377.5 1 314.4 3
Non-financial assets 396.9 4 270.2 5 370.9 3 370.2 3
Financial assets 329.9 3 387.8 3 493.1 1 433.1 3
of which:  Equities 61.2 2 71.7 3 110.9 4 78.8 5
Total assets 726.8 2 658.0 3 863.9 2 803.4 2
Liabilities 115.8 2 106.5 2 115.6 2 118.7 2
of which:  Mortgages 81.3 1 78.1 1 83.5 1 85.7 1
United States
Net wealth 474.5 6 508.2 5 587.4 5 555.6 6
Net financial wealth 259.0 2 304.5 1 370.3 2 330.3 2
Non-financial assets 215.5 7 203.7 7 217.1 7 225.4 7
Financial assets 345.6 2 398.3 2 475.2 3 439.1 2
of which:  Equities 52.1 4 97.7 1 147.6 2 122.5 2
Total assets 561.1 6 601.9 4 692.3 5 664.5 5
Liabilities 86.6 4 93.7 5 104.9 5 108.9 5
of which:  Mortgages 60.3 2 63.5 3 70.5 3 74.5 2
Notes: The left-hand figures denote assets and liabilities outstanding at the end of the year as a
percent of nominal disposable income, while the right-hand figures denote the rank of each
country.  Most figures are based on the UN System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA93) and,
more specifically, for European Union countries, on the corresponding European System of
Accounts 1995 (ESA95).
Households include non-profit institutions serving households. Net wealth is defined as non-
financial and financial assets minus liabilities; net financial wealth is financial assets minus
liabilities. Non-financial assets include stock of durable goods and dwellings, at replacement cost
and at market value, respectively. Financial assets comprise currency and deposits, securities
other than shares, loans, shares and other equity, insurance technical reserves; and other accounts
receivable/payable. Not included are assets with regard to social security pension insurance
schemes. Equities comprise shares and other equity, including quoted, unquoted and mutual fund
shares. See also OECD Economic Outlook  Sources and Methods
(http://www.oecd.org/eco/sources-and-methods).
Primary sources: Banque de France, Flow of Funds Accounts. Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank,
Monthly Report  and  Financial accounts for Germany 1991  to 1999, Special  Statistical
Publication, 2000.  Italy: Banca d'Italia,  Supplements to the Statistical Bulletin ; Ando,  A.,
L.Guiso,  I.Visco (eds.), Saving and  the Accumulation of Wealth,  Cambridge University Press,
1994; OECD, Financial Accounts of OECD countries . Japan: Economic Planning Agency,
Government of Japan, Annual Report on National Accounts.  United Kingdom:  Office for
National Statistics, United Kingdom National  Accounts,  and Financial Statistics.  United
States: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.
Source： OECD Economic Outlook , vol. 2003/1, no. 73 (June 2003); vol. 2003/2, no. 74
(December 2003), Annex Table 56.
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Country 1990 1995 2000 2001
Canada
Share of equities in
financial assets 18.3 4 20.1 3 26.4 5 27.9 3T
Share of mortgages in
liabilities 63.7 5 66.6 4 61.8 6 60.7 6
France
Share of equities in
financial assets 46.0 1 34.1 1 43.3 2 38.6 1
Share of long-term loans in
liabilities 67.9 4 75.9 1 72.1 3 68.1 4
Germany
Share of equities in
financial assets 5.8 7 17.9 6 27.0 4 25.0 5
Share of mortgages in
liabilities 76.6 1 60.6 6 63.3 5 64.4 5
Italy
Share of equities in
financial assets 20.4 2 18.3 5 44.7 1 35.7 2
Share of medium- and
long-term loans in 47.1 6 60.7 5 72.8 1 73.7 1
Japan
Share of equities in
financial assets 14.4 6 10.8 7 9.0 7 7.1 7
Share of mortgages in
liabilities 38.7 7 42.7 7 44.4 7 44.6 7
United Kingdom
Share of equities in
financial assets 18.6 3 18.5 4 22.5 6 18.2 6
Share of mortgages in
liabilities 70.2 2 73.3 2 72.3 2 72.2 2
United States
Share of equities in
financial assets 15.1 5 24.5 2 31.1 3 27.9 3T
Share of mortgages in
liabilities 69.6 3 67.8 3 67.2 4 68.4 3
Source: Table 3.
Notes: The right-hand figures indicate the rank of each country.
Table 4: Share of Equities in Financial Assets and Share of Mortgages in Liabilities in the
Group of Seven Countries, 1990-2001
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Country
Canada 2,041 64.51 2 7,720 67.88 2 15,209 62.67 3 15,939 65.22 3
France 1,943 61.41 3 7,183 63.16 3 13,392 55.19 7 14,245 58.29 7
Germany 1,730 54.68 5 6,823 59.99 5 14,829 61.11 5 15,139 61.95 5
Italy 1,711 54.08 6 6,827 60.03 4 15,031 61.94 4 15,627 63.95 4
Japan 1,405 44.41 7 6,640 58.38 6 14,248 58.71 6 14,569 59.62 6
United Kingdom 1,908 60.30 4 6,637 58.36 7 15,944 65.70 2 16,745 68.52 2
United States 3,164 100.00 1 11,373 100.00 1 24,267 100.00 1 24,438 100.00 1
Group of Seven Mean 1,986 7,600 16,131 16,672
OECD Mean 1,935 7,155 15,234 15,656
Table 5: Consumption Levels in the Group of Seven Countries, 1970-2001
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, National Accounts of OECD Countries , Volume 1, 1990-2001: Main
Aggregates  (Paris: OECD, 2003), pp. 346-347.
Notes: The left-hand figures show per capita household final consumption expenditure at current prices and current purchasing power parities
(U.S. dollars), the middle figures show the ratio of the left-hand figure to the figure for the United States, and the right-hand figures show the
rank of each country.   The OECD means exclude the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic.
1970 1985 2000 2001
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Purpose of consumption Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US G7
1990
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 10.93 14.95 12.94 18.25 16.46 11.41 8.48 13.35
Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics 4.53 3.54 4.15 3.06 3.27 4.96 2.44 3.71
Clothing and footwear 6.49 6.27 7.50 9.69 7.94 5.22 5.15 6.89
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 24.86 22.48 22.12 18.87 21.62 18.68 18.47 21.01
Furnishings, household equipment and routine
maintenance of the house 6.90 6.71 7.74 9.67 4.83 5.33 4.99 6.60
Health 3.69 3.16 3.02 2.06 3.27 1.61 16.58 4.77
Transport 14.82 15.53 15.69 12.28 10.98 15.25 11.26 13.69
Communications 1.66 1.57 1.67 1.54 1.13 1.59 1.61 1.54
Recreation and culture 9.32 8.18 9.51 7.40 11.31 9.92 7.30 8.99
Education 0.72 0.65 0.77 1.01 2.44 1.11 2.36 1.29
Restaurants and hotels 8.22 7.78 5.81 8.60 6.38 12.56 6.57 7.99
Miscellaneous goods and services 7.85 9.18 9.09 7.57 10.38 12.35 14.80 10.17
2001
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 9.92 13.74 12.31 15.15 14.25 10.27 7.09 11.82
Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics 3.39 2.99 3.81 2.36 2.94 3.81 1.70 3.00
Clothing and footwear 5.73 5.06 6.67 9.49 5.06 7.31 6.03 6.48
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 23.91 23.09 23.55 17.93 24.15 16.09 15.97 20.67
Furnishings, household equipment and routine
maintenance of the house 6.70 6.22 7.41 9.48 4.92 6.41 5.53 6.67
Health 4.28 3.70 3.93 2.80 3.55 1.25 15.92 5.06
Transport 14.63 14.84 13.90 12.36 10.32 14.39 11.28 13.10
Communications 2.22 3.52 3.27 3.94 3.76 3.09 2.44 3.18
Recreation and culture 11.27 9.61 9.77 8.19 12.43 14.93 10.59 10.97
Education 1.14 0.61 0.65 0.98 1.94 1.19 2.15 1.24
Restaurants and hotels 7.55 7.22 4.97 9.42 7.08 10.21 6.07 7.50
Miscellaneous goods and services 9.27 9.40 9.77 7.89 9.62 11.06 15.23 10.32
Table 6: Household Final Consumption Expenditure by Purpose for the Group of Seven Countries, 1990 and 2001
(continued)
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Notes: The figures show consumption for each purpose as a share of the final consumption
expenditure of households in the economic territory, both at 1995 prices.  The figures for Germany
are for 1991 instead of 1990 and for 2000 instead of 2001 because figures for 1990 and 2001 are not
available, and the figures for the United States are for 2000 instead of 2001 because figures for 2001
are not available.
Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, National Accounts of OECD
Countries , Volume II, 1989-2001: Detailed Tables  (Paris: OECD, 2002).  The 2001 figures for
Japan are from the same source as Figure 1.
Table 6 (continued)
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Endnotes 
                                                  
1 In one government survey, 61.4 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement: “The 
Japanese are said to be frugal and saving-lovers, and I think this is a good thing.”  See Kenichi 
Tominaga and Takao Mamada, Nihonjin no Chochiku: Koudou to Ishiki (The Saving of the 
Japanese: Behavior and Attitudes) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyouronsha, 1995) (in Japanese). 
 
2 Charles Yuji Horioka, “Consuming and Saving,” in Andrew Gordon, ed., Postwar Japan as 
History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 259-92. 
 
3 The second major difference between the two series is that the series based on SNA68 
includes payments in kind for medical and other services from social insurance (i.e., the portion 
of the cost of medical and other services covered by social insurance) in household disposable 
income and consumption whereas the series based on SNA93 does not.  In order to make the 
two series as comparable as possible, the author added payments in kind for medical and other 
services from social insurance to household disposable income when computing the household 
saving rate from the data based on SNA93. 
 
4 The discrepancy between the National Accounts data based on SNA93 and OECD data on 
Japan’s household saving rate is due primarily to the treatment of payments in kind for medical 
and other services from social insurance (see footnote 3 above for details). 
 
5 See, for example, Fumio Hayashi, “Why Is Japan’s Saving Rate So Apparently High?” in 
Stanley Fischer, ed., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 1986), 147-210, and Charles Yuji Horioka, “Is Japan's Household Saving Rate 
Really High?” Review of Income and Wealth, series 41, no. 4 (December 1995):373-397. 
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